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Abstract—Since 2008, VTT has used a formal verification 
method called model checking to verify instrumentation 
and control (I&C) application logic design in practical 
projects in the Finnish nuclear industry. In this paper, we 
present seven examples of the 66 confirmed design issues 
that we have detected. We then discuss potential causes why 
only formal verification revealed the otherwise hidden 
issues. We hope the examples will be useful in case studies 
related to verification and quality assurance of I&C. 
Keywords—instrumentation and control; model checking; 
verification and validation, function block diagram 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Model checking [1] is a formal verification method, 
where a software tool (called a model checker) is used to 
prove if a model of a system satisfies stated formal 
properties. In Finland, the method has been applied for 
over a decade to verify instrumentation and control (I&C) 
application logic design in two new-build projects 
(Olkiluoto 3 EPR, and the functional design for the 
Hanhikivi-1 AES-2006) and an I&C renewal project (for 
the two Loviisa VVER-440 units). To date, in all these 
projects combined, VTT has detected 66 confirmed 
design issues of varying probability and safety relevance. 
We discuss the tools, the work process, and the 
limitations in [2], and the customer projects in more detail 
in [3]. 
In this paper, we reveal seven examples of the design 
issues we have detected. We have modified and 
simplified the designs in order to mask their origin, and 
focus on the parts that caused the issues. Similar 
examples can also be found in our previous publications 
[2][3][4][5][6][7][8]. We have detected all of the issues using 
the free, open source model checker NuSMV [9]. 
II. EXAMPLES OF DESIGN ISSUES 
We recorded the analysis times below on an Intel Core 
i7-6600U CPU with a clock rate of 2.6 GHz. 
A. Example 1: Exact timing of input signals produces 
unwanted response 
The intended functionality for the “design pattern” in 
Fig 1. is that an active CRITERION leads to a minute long 
pulse of ACT, but if CRITERION is reset, so is ACT. 
However, if ACT only flashes on very quickly, and then 
becomes permanently active exactly one minute later, the 
Pulse element will not react to the latter rising edge, and 
the function is not actuated (save for the very short pulse 
at the start). The “design pattern” was used in several 
functions of the verified system. 
In just 0.04 seconds, NuSMV generates a counter-
example for the LTL [1] property: G (¬CRITERION ∧ X 
CRITERION → X ACT).  
 
Fig 1. The logic and the counterexample (as a timing diagram) 
for example 1 
B. Example 2: Two connected safety functions 
permanently frozen 
The intended functionality for the two safety functions 
A and B, as simplified in Fig 2., is that if A is set, and then 
(within 5 seconds) B is set, then function A will be reset. 
However, in the (counterintuitive, in its original context) 
scenario where B is not active in the 5-second time 
window after A’s actuation, the logic ends up in state 
where A is permanently set, and B permanently reset. (To 
reactivate the Pulse and set ACT_B to TRUE, ACT_A 
would first need to be reset to FALSE, which is not 
possible as long as ACT_B remains FALSE.) 
 
Fig 2. The logic and the counterexample for example 2 
The originally verified model consisted of 17 function 
blocks. NuSMV takes 0.38 seconds to produce the 
counterexample for the LTL property: G (ACT_A → X 
X X X ((¬SET_A ∧ SET_B) → ¬ACT_A)). 
C. Example 3: Instantaneous process variable drop 
leaves the function unactuated  
The intended functionality for the logic in Fig 3. is to 
initiate a function (ACT) when a certain process variable 
(VAR) drops below 10, and then stop the order when the 
variable proceeds to drop below 8 (actual values masked). 
However, in the physically very unlikely scenario where 
the variable would drop instantaneously (within a 
processing cycle) from above 10 to below 8, the function 
is never actuated. 
 
Fig 3. The logic and the counterexample for example 3 
The originally verified model consisted of 60 function 
blocks. NuSMV takes 8.6 seconds to generate the 
counterexample for the LTL property: G ((VAR > 10) ∧ 
X (VAR < 10) → X ACT). 
 
Fig 4. The logic and the counterexample for example 4 
D. Example 4: Valve left in incorrect position after 
fluctuating inputs 
The intended functionality for the logic in Fig 4. is to 
open a certain valve if the pressure is high (HIGH_P) and 
the process conditions (COND) otherwise allow for it. 
When the pressure returns to normal (¬HIGH_P), the 
logic shall again close the valve. However, Fig 4. shows a 
scenario where (1) HIGH_P is first active for a short time 
while COND is not, (2) HIGH_P is then again active 
while COND is also TRUE, and (3) HIGH_P then again 
resets, before 10 seconds have passed since the last time 
it was FALSE. In this scenario, the closing-side Pulse 
block does not respond to the second falling edge of 
HIGH_P (as it still processing the earlier 10-second 
pulse), and the logic leaves the valve open. 
NuSMV takes 0.17 seconds to generate the 
counterexample for the LTL property: G ((COND ∧ 
HIGH_P) ∧ X (COND ∧ ¬HIGH_P) → X (CLOSE ∧ 
¬OPEN)). 
E. Example 5: Contradictory commands to an actuator 
(on fluctuating inputs) 
The intended functionality for the logic in Fig 6. is that 
when the process condition (COND) changes to TRUE, 
the START output is active for 10 seconds. When the 
process condition then resets, STOP is active for one 
second. However, Fig 5. shows a scenario, where (1) 
COND is first set, (2) COND is then reset, (3) soon 
afterwards, COND is again set, and (4) exactly one second 
after step 2, COND is again reset. In this scenario, the left-
side (STOP) Pulse does not react to the rising edge of its 
input on step 4, as it is just at the end of the previous pulse. 
The actuator receives contradictory commands, and no 
separate STOP at the end. 
 
Fig 5. The logic and the counterexample for example 5 
The originally verified model consisted of 156 function 
blocks. NuSMV takes 5.1 seconds to generate the 
counterexample for the LTL property: G (COND ∧ X 
¬COND → X STOP). 
F. Example 6: Several channels inhibited 
simultaneously 
The intended functionality for the logic in Fig 6. is that 
when an operator inhibits a channel by turning a switch 
(SWT), a signal is sent to the other channels, preventing 
them from being inhibited at the same time. However, if 
many switches are turned at the exact same time (which 
the operators are not supposed to do), each channel is 
inhibited, as the signals from the other channels are 
received on the next cycle. 
 
Fig 6. The logic and the counterexample for example 6 
The originally verified model consisted of 118 
function blocks. NuSMV takes 1.9 seconds to generate the 
counterexample for the LTL property: G ¬(INH_1 ∧ 
INH_2). 
G. Example 7: Contradictory commands to an actuator 
(on contradictory inputs) 
The intended functionality for the logic in Fig 7. is that 
an actuator is started when the measurement is below 8 
units, and stopped when the measurement is above 10 
units. The logic performs a type of majority vote by 
starting based on the second-lowest measurement, and 
stopping based on the second-highest measurement. 
However, on the kind of highly unlikely measurement 
data (perhaps attributable to multiple equipment failure) 
shown in Fig 7., the controlled actuator receives 
contradictory commands. 
 
Fig 7. The logic and the counterexample for example 7 
The originally verified model consisted of 19 function 
blocks. NuSMV takes 14 seconds to generate the 
counterexample for the LTL property: G ¬(START ∧ 
STOP). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Most of the designs we verified in the practical 
projects had already been subjected to verification and 
validation (V&V) based on more conventional methods 
(e.g., testing). Therefore, the detected issues often have 
some features that make them hard to find without formal 
verification. A potential cause is that the scenario needed 
to reveal the issue is highly unlikely and/or 
counterintuitive. In Table 1, we list common features of 
the issues and the scenarios (counterexamples) that 
revealed them. 
Table 1 Features or causes of the issues 
Feature / cause Issues Share Examples 
Spurious actuation 22 33% 4,[2][8] 
Exact timing 21 32% 1,5,6,[2][6][7][8] 
Human user actions 19 29% 6,[2][3][6][7][8] 
Uncharacteristic input 14 21% 2,3,7 
Signal validity logic 6 9% [2] 
Frozen (deadlock) 5 8% 2 
33% of the issues feature spurious actuation, which is 
otherwise hard to analyze [2]. In testing, for example, it is 
much easier to address the intended functionality. 32% of 
the issues feature exact (millisecond-level) timing, which 
might not be possible to reproduce in a test field or plant 
simulator [7]. In 29% of the scenarios, operators or 
maintenance personnel perform ill-advised or ill-timed 
actions. 
By “uncharacteristic input”, we refer to scenarios 
where the inputs of the model that represent process 
measurements have values that are not likely (or even 
possible) when we consider the actual physical and 
chemical processes of the controlled plant. More exactly, 
we mean scenarios where (1) the process variables show 
a combination of values that is physically unlikely, or (2) 
a process variable changes its value faster than is 
physically likely. We do not model the controlled plant, 
so the model inputs can have arbitrary values at each 
counterexample step. (Sometimes, the analyst is able to 
alter the scenario first produced by the model checker into 
a more likely one, but here we refer to scenarios where 
such modification was not possible.) Such input data are 
one of the causes in 21% of the issues. 
In 9%, the issue is at least partially caused by signal 
validity processing, a common feature [2] in fault-tolerant 
nuclear I&C logics (see [2] for an exemplar issue). Finally, 
in five cases, the logic permanently froze to some output 
state. 
Another potential cause that makes the issues hard to 
detect without formal verification is the complexity of the 
logic design. Function block diagrams make it relatively 
easy to understand the “flow” of control from input to 
output values. Elements that interfere with this flow make 
it harder to figure the logic out, leaving room for the 
designer to make a choice that enables unintended 
behavior (and making it harder for a reviewer to detect the 
issue). In Table 2, we show the prevalence of such 
elements in the logics that then contained design issues. 
Table 2 Design elements in the logics behind the issues 
Element in logic Issues Share Examples 
Memory 43 65% 2,3,[2][3][5][6][7][8] 
Delay 43 65% 1,2,4,5,[4] 
Feedback loop 20 30% 2,6,[4][7] 
65% of the logics contained a memory (bistable latch, 
flip-flop) block. 65% contained a delay element (with a 
configurable delay time). 30% contained a feedback loop. 
(A cycle delay block used to specify the processing order 
in a feedback loop also acts as a type of memory/delay.) 
We have significantly simplified the original logics 
for this paper, and included in the examples only the 
minimum number of blocks needed to recreate the issues. 
As stated above, the original logics could contain up to 
156 function blocks, and the problematic elements were 
not necessarily as close to one another on the diagram. 
What can look like an obvious mistake in this paper was 
not necessarily as apparent in the original context, at least 
for manual review. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Designing fault-free I&C software is hard. What is 
also hard is to invent interesting, credible application 
software design errors. Observations of nuclear safety 
I&C systems failing during operation are actually so rare, 
that it is making software probabilistic safety assessment 
(PSA) hard [10]. The contribution of this paper is a set of 
real-world examples of actual design issues. We hope that 
the examples prove useful in different case studies to 
support research on testing, test automation, simulation, 
model checking, theorem proving, run-time verification, 
and other V&V activities. 
In addition, we of course hope that our examples help 
prove the point that formal verification methods should 
already be in much wider use. 
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